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Fiscal Decentralisation: The Swiss Case
Victoria Curzon Price
Abstract
Switzerland provides a potential laboratory for testing various hypotheses connected with tax
competition because of its extremely decentralized fiscal system. Twenty-six cantons (some of
them extremely small) have retained the ultimate power of deciding tax questions, and hence not
only to limit the Federal level of the State to about 1/3 of total public expenditure, but also to
retain absolute power to set their own levels of taxation. Furthermore, citizens can launch
referenda on tax issues at any level of government.
Fiscal competition between cantons should therefore be easy to spot, resulting in lower tax
cantons enjoying higher economic growth (the “classical” hypothesis), or in a “race to the bottom”
with lower tax cantons offering a lower level of public services (the “harmful competition”
hypothesis). In fact, neither of these hypotheses is confirmed. This leads the author to suggest a
third hypothesis based on public choice theory (politicians in high-income cantons are led to raise
high taxes). The author suggests that the classical and the public choice hypotheses cancel each
other out, leaving a mixed picture. The article ends with some reflexions on the implications of the
Swiss experience for fiscal harmonization at a European level.
La Suisse offre un véritable laboratoire pour tester plusieurs hypothèses de concurrence
fiscale en raison de son système fiscal extrêmement décentralisé. Vingt six cantons (dont quelques
uns très petits) ont conservé le pouvoir suprême de décider les questions fiscales et, donc, non
seulement de limiter le niveau fédéral de l’Etat à 1/3 des dépenses publiques totales, mais aussi de
conserver le pouvoir absolu pour fixer leurs propres niveaux de taxation. De plus, les habitants
peuvent lancer des référendums en matière fiscale à tout niveau du gouvernement.
La concurrence fiscale entre les cantons devrait être par conséquent plus facile à repérer, les
cantons les moins imposés ayant une croissance économique supérieure (hypothèse classique), ou
en un « nivellement par le bas » face aux cantons les moins imposés offrant un niveau inférieur de
services publics (hypothèse de “concurrence néfaste”). En fait, aucune de ces hypothèses n’est
confirmée. Cela conduit l’auteur à suggérer une troisième hypothèse basée sur la théorie des
décisions publiques (les politiciens des cantons à revenus élevés sont conduits à lever des impôts
élevés). L’auteur suggère que les hypothèses classiques et celles des décisions publiques se
neutralisent l’une l’autre, laissant place à un modèle mixte. L’article se termine par quelques
réflexions quant aux implications de l’expérience Suisse pour une harmonisation fiscale au niveau
européen.
KEYWORDS: Swiss, decentralised fiscal system, “classical” hypothesis, Public Choice
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FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: THE
SWISS CASE*
Victoria Curzon Price°
1. Introduction
This paper discusses three hypotheses linked to the question of fiscal
decentralization. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) holds that ﬁscal decentralization promotes competition
between ﬁscal authorities and providers of public goods, leading to a lower level
of taxation, a higher quality of public goods (also because of decentralized
decision-taking) and a higher level of economic efficiency.  We call this the
“classical view” of the beneﬁts of competition as applied to the question of taxation
and the supply of public goods.
It can be contrasted with Hypothesis 2 (H2), which sees competition as
harmful, leading in tax questions to a “race to the bottom”, a dearth of public
goods, inefficient factor movements as mobile factors attempt to exploit tax
differences and free riding from spill-over effects.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) is based on public choice theory and holds that high
levels of taxation are associated with high incomes, since neither politicians nor
voters can resist the temptation to tax and spend if the economy is prosperous and
ﬂourishing.
In what follows, we shall try to see which hypothesis holds best for
Switzerland.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the support of IREF in preparing this paper and the
comments provided by Andrea CUOMO
° University of Geneva
Volume 13, numéro 4, Décembre 2003, pp. 527-544.
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It is well known that Switzerland is probably the most fiscally
decentralized of all federal states, and (since federalism is in itself the most
decentralized method of government) is therefore the most ﬁscally decentralized
country in the world.  It is composed of 26 sovereign states, or cantons, which
have retained their ﬁscal sovereignty for the 150 years that modern Switzerland has
been in existence.  In principle, therefore, it should be possible to observe ﬁscal
competition at work in this real-life laboratory.  However, the effect of fiscal
decentralization on the over-all level of taxation has to be shared with another
quite exceptional feature of the Swiss Constitution – the right of citizens to initiate
referenda on any matter of public interest, including (and perhaps most
importantly) taxation.
The 26 sovereign cantons collectively decide by a complicated triple majority
system (both houses of parliament and direct referenda) what resources the federal
government should enjoy and how they should be levied.  They have also agreed,
since 1848, that certain tasks are best assigned to the federal level of government –
otherwise why bother with a federal structure in the first place?  But the legal
competence to decide this arises at the cantonal level, today transposed to the Federal
Constitution1.
Switzerland thus practises bottom-up subsidiarity2.  The lower levels of
government (the cantons) devolve power to a higher level of government (the
federation) in cases where the higher level of government is (exceptionally) deemed
to be the more appropriate.  This is very different from top-down subsidiarity, where
the higher level of government devolves to lower levels matters in which it
(exceptionally) deems itself to be less effective.  The locus of power is essential when
it comes to applying the principle of subsidiarity in practice and will give rise to a very
different division of labour between levels of government depending on which level
of government takes the decision. Thus, bottom-up subsidiarity would tend to result in
more decentralisation than top-down subsidiarity.
The cantons also practise top-down subsidiarity and devolve part of their
tasks to lower levels of government – some 3,000  « communes ».  The communes
enjoy no more ﬁscal sovereignty than does the federal government – they act as
agents for the cantons in areas (such as nursery schools or street-cleaning) where it
is felt they are more efﬁcient providers of public goods.
The cantons are in competition with each other.  They are constantly torn
between avoiding ﬁscal « inefﬁciency » (a euphemism for ﬁscal competition and
free-riding on other cantons’ public services) and maintaining their fiscal
sovereignty.  They aim at – and achieve – a delicate balance, described below.
1 Schoenenberger/Zarin-Nejadan-1994, pp. 67-78, Weber-1991.
2 As is well known, “subsidiarity” consists in the principle that tasks are best accomplished
by small units.  Applied to government, the rule of subsidiarity implies that tasks should be
accomplished by the lowest level of government compatible with efﬁciency:  as a matter of
principle one should therefore minimize centralization and maximize devolution.  In
practice, however, the exact division of labour between levels of government cannot be
determined scientifically, and is always a matter of judgment – by those who are in a
position to decide.
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2. Basic structure of Swiss taxation
The most original aspect of the Swiss system of government is the right of
the adult population to vote on any public issue giving rise to new legislation,
including taxes, at all three levels of government.  The referendum is an integral
part of the law-making process.  Furthermore, the public can also initiate referenda
to repeal or amend existing laws, or initiate new ones.  They do not have to wait
for the political class to set the agenda.  
The combination of political decentralization and referenda has resulted in
a generally low level of taxation.  Total tax revenue represents only a little over
30% of Swiss GNP (not including social security charges), a much lower proportion
than in the rest of Europe, but already high enough for it to be an issue in Swiss
politics.  Other receipts from various fee-paying public entities (the post ofﬁce, the
alcohol monopoly etc.) increase this proportion slightly, but while this adds to the
capacity for public spending, these receipts will not be taken into account in the
context of this paper.  
One should add to total tax revenue, however, the cost of social insurance
which, though it is provided on a semi-private basis (as far as health and pensions
are concerned) is nevertheless compulsory.  The public share of social insurance
adds another 5.7% points to the public sector, raising it to 35.7% of GDP.  This
ﬁgure does not include health insurance, which is still in the private sector (though
heavily regulated).    In 1970’s these ratios were a good 10 percentage points lower
than in 2000, which suggests that Switzerland has not escaped the general trend to
bigger government (mainly due to increased cost of social welfare), despite ﬁscal
decentralization.  Neither H1 nor H2 are conﬁrmed by this trend.
The following redistributive mechanisms are built into the Swiss tax system :
• From rich cantons to poor cantons (13% of federal tax – see below);– 
• From rich communes to poor communes within cantons (at their discretion);
• From richer to poorer individuals, through progressive income tax structures
and widespread cantonal wealth taxes;
• From single, childless taxpayers to families, through a system of deductions
against income;
• From active to retired members of the population, through a minimum state
pension (24,000 CHF per annum, largely responsible for the growth of federal
expenditures since 1980);
• From the employed to the unemployed, through compulsory unemployment
insurance;
• From the ﬁt to the unlucky, through compulsory accident insurance
(deductions for the last three forms of insurance are split 50 :50 between
employer and employee and currently amount to 10.5% of income);
• From the healthy to the sick, through compulsory (but privately provided)
health insurance;
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• From the general public to farmers (i.e. from lowland to mountain areas);
• From salaried employees to the self-employed (it is generally assumed that the
latter make the most of all possible deductions and avoid paying most income
taxes perfectly legally).
The social welfare system is shared out between all three levels of government, as
well as the private sector.  The only item which is entirely federal is the minimum
state pension.
The cantons still collect most of the taxes and act for the federal
government in the execution of many of its tasks. However, since the introduction
of VAT at the federal level at a rate of 6% in 1996, this balance is moving in Bern’s
favour and it is possible that the trend will accelerate in the future as the rate of
VAT increases to meet growing social expenditures at all levels.  At present VAT
(today at a rate of 7.6%) represents 35% of Federal tax receipts.  Cantons rely
mainly on income and capital taxes, while the federal government relies mainly on
indirect taxation (VAT, excise taxes, stamp duties etc.).  Personal income tax
accounts for only 22% of Federal tax receipts.
Switzerland enjoys all the usual forms of taxation that one ﬁnds elsewhere,
though at somewhat lower rates.  Some forms of tax are exclusive to the federal
level (customs duties, VAT etc.) ;  others are exclusive to the cantonal/communal
levels (personal wealth tax) ;  while still others are common to all three levels of
government (personal income tax). 
It will be noted that there is no personal wealth or capital gains tax at
federal level, although a « participation » tax is levied when large shareholdings
(over 25%) are realized with capital gains.  The argument used by the federal
authorities is that a capital gains tax on small amounts is too costly to administer,
although equity would normally argue in favour of such a tax (Conseil fédéral
1983, para. 144.31).
It will also be noted that the withholding tax on interest and dividends
levied at federal level at the rate of 35% can be reclaimed by tax payers, who will
do so if their marginal rate of taxation is below this level.  It is worth noting that
this tax (dating back to 1943) is one of the oldest at federal level and used to
account for almost half federal revenues.  However, today tax reclaims are now
almost equal to the entire revenues from the withholding tax, suggesting that most
investors now declare this income and that the marginal rate of taxation is
generally below 35%.
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TABLE 1
STRUCTURE OF TAXATION BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND TYPE OF TAX
Confederation Cantons Communes
Personal income tax X X X
Personal wealth tax X X
Corporate proﬁt tax X X X
Corporate wealth tax X X X
Capital gains tax X X
Inheritance & gift tax X X
Real estate taxes X X
Real estate transactions tax X X
Withholding tax on interest & dividends X
Stamp tax on ﬁnancial transactions X
Customs duties X
VAT X
Excise taxes, environmental taxes X
Military service exemption tax X
« other » consumption taxes X X X
Other receipts (PTT, alcohol 
monopoly, factor income, « forfait » X X X
(lifestyle tax for non-Swiss)
Social security payroll levies X
Sources : CORNEVIN-PFEIFFER Katrin et MANZINI Antonio « Le ﬁnancement de l’Etat » in WEBER Luc (ed.) Les ﬁnances publiques
d’un Etat fédératif :  la Suisse, Economica, Paris et Genève, 1991, pp.87-188, p.118 ; Administration fédérale des Finances, Charge
ﬁscale en Suisse 2001, Recettes ﬁscales de la confédération, Recettes ﬁscales des cantons et communes, dernières années disponibles.
Administration Fédérale des Finances, Finances publiques en Suisse, diverses années.  Also : Conseil fédéral, Message concernant les
lois fédérales sur l’harmonisation des impôts directs des cantons et des communes ainsi que sur l’impôt fédéral (Message sur
l’harmonisation ﬁscale) du 25 mai 1983.
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3. A move to reduce fiscal « inefficiencies »:
harmonization of the tax base
In 1990, Switzerland adopted a federal law on the harmonization of
cantonal tax bases (Loi fédérale sur l’harmonisation des impôts directs des cantons
et des communes : LFHID).  This concluded a long process, started in 1968, to
reduce the complexity and diversity that many years of cantonal ﬁscal sovereignty
had produced and to limit so-called « inefﬁciencies » (in other words, inter-cantonal
ﬁscal competition).  
The legal and formal deﬁnitions of the types of tax, by whom they are due,
what type of allowances to permit, their deﬁnition, administrative procedures and
measures to ensure enforcement are now harmonised.  Actual tax rates, however,
remain ﬁrmly within the province of the cantons, with the exception of the federal
taxes, the rates of which are naturally determined at federal level, with the consent
of the two houses of parliament and the people.
Harmonization therefore remains partial. No canton is obliged to levy the
same taxes as its neighbours.  However, if a canton decides to levy, for example, a
capital gains tax, then it must follow the agreed, harmonized deﬁnition of what
capital gains consist of.  Formal harmonization is supposed to have put a stop to
fiscal competition which took the form of all sorts of ad hoc allowances and
deductions, which varied from canton to canton and which were often arbitrarily
decided upon3.
It took over 30 years to achieve this level of coordination, showing how
sensitive the issue is.  The cantonal authorities are indeed acutely aware of the
trade-offs. If they want to limit inter-cantonal tax-hopping and free-riding on the
part of mobile tax-payers/tax-beneﬁciaries, they must either agree to a minimum
amount of harmonization of tax systems and levels among themselves (especially
between neighbouring cantons), or agree to raise the problem to the federal level.
They are loath to do either.  In fact, all three avenues are used, to some degree.
Inter-cantonal tax disparities exist, but are kept within bounds, such that systemic
tax-hopping is not much in evidence;  but some is tolerated as a lesser evil, while
some issues are pushed up to the federal level.
4. Growing centralization
In the 1960s Switzerland developed its own version of the welfare state,
which mirrors many of the features found elsewhere in Europe, but which relies to
a greater degree than most on market-based providers.  It is clear that social
transfers are potentially troublesome for a federation like Switzerland, where
geographic distances are small and people can very easily live in one canton and
3 Cornevin-Pfeiffer/Manzini-1991, p. 131
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work in another, or simply “vote with their feet” by moving from one canton to
another.  The consensus was that the minimum state pension scheme should
therefore not be left to the cantons to decide upon, but should be raised to the
federal level in order to ensure that the pool of beneﬁciaries coincided with the
pool of contributors, and to prevent any competition between cantons on this
account.  This was probably the single most important centralizing move in the
past 50 years.  It gave rise, over time, to a crisis in federal ﬁnances.  This was ﬁnally
resolved by the adoption of VAT, another major centralizing move.  Along with
endowing the federal government with a new, modern, and broad tax base, and
thus resolving the federal deﬁcit crisis, the adoption of VAT was also motivated by
a desire to render Switzerland as “Euro-compatible” as possible. 
The effect of these two inter-connected developments on Switzerland’s
centralization ratio (share of central government in total tax revenues) is now
becoming apparent (see Table 2).  Thus according to the OECD the federal level of
government accounted for 32 % of total government receipts in 2000 (as opposed
to 28% in 1975).
TABLE  2:  Share of central government, 1975 & 2000
as a % of total government revenue, (including social security charges)
Change
1975 2000 1975=100
% %
Belgium 65 39 59
Japan 47 38 80
Sweden 51 42 83
Canada 48 42 88
Germany 34 31 91
Denmark 68 62 91
Finland 59 54 91
Austria 51 46 92
France 52 48 93
Netherlands 60 57 96
Spain 48 48 99
USA 46 46 102
Portugal 65 67 103
Luxembourg 64 68 106
Ireland 77 85 110
UK 71 79 111
Italy 53 60 113
Switzerland 28 32 118
Norway 52 62 119
Source:  OECD (2002)  derived from Tables 3 (pp.73-74), 4 (p.75), 133 (p. 219,
135 (p. 221)
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However, if we exclude social charges and include vertical transfers from federal
to cantonal level, and from cantonal to local level, the trend towards centralization
is even more marked:  federal tax receipts rose from 32% in 1975 to 39% of the
total in 2000, cantonal shares remained stable, and communal shares fell from 30%
to 24% (see Table 3). This begs the question of what might be responsible for this
trend, since social transfers have been removed from the data.  
One reason for the centralizing trend might be that there are economies of
scale in raising revenue and/or providing public goods.  This is certainly one
reason VAT is levied at a single rate throughout Switzerland, and why the trend
towards centralization on the revenue side is set to rise in the future.  This
argument is frequently used in Switzerland by parties on both sides of the political
spectrum to support further centralization.  
TABLE 3
Tax receipts after vertical transfers (social charges not included) 
% shares, 1975-2000
Federal Cantonal Communal 
level level level
1975 32 38 30
1980 30 40 29
1985 33 38 29
1990 36 36 27
1995 38 36 26
2000 39 37 24
Source: Administration fédérale des Finances, Charge fiscale en Suisse, various
issues, Recettes fiscales de la Confédération, various issues, Recettes fiscles des
Cantons et Communes, various issues.
Another reason might lie in the political dynamics of federal systems.
Thus, in any federal system, state and local politicians have an incentive to try to
ﬁnance local projects out of centralized general taxes.  In this they will ﬁnd willing
allies in other state and local politicians pursuing the same objective.  Log-rolling
and inter-cantonal dealing will surface at the federal level, where federal politicians
will generally be only too happy to go along.  State and local politicians in
Switzerland, furthermore, represent sovereign entities which ultimately decide on
the tasks to be accomplished at federal level.  The result may be a cross-party
political collusion against the public.  The introduction of VAT in Switzerland in
1996 ﬁts this hypothesis rather well – all political parties of any importance, at all
levels, were in favour of the measure.  Only the public was against it.  In the end,
after four referenda, the politicians ﬁnally won.
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5. Growth of government
During this period, the general level of taxation in Switzerland also grew (see
Table 4), mainly because of the development of social insurance and social
services, broadly deﬁned.   
Thus taxes (including social security charges) rose from 28% of GDP in
1975 to 35.7% in 2000, an increase in 28 per cent (outdone only by Italy, Spain and
Portugal).  While the over-all level of taxation remains below the OECD average
(40%), the trend is on the high side.  More time is needed to see where the trend is
leading.
Given the link between social services and centralization described above,
it would seem that there has been, historically, a link between centralization and
the growth of government in general.  But it would be unwise to infer a more
general link between these two trends.
TABLE  4
Taxes as % GDP (including social security)
change 
1970 1975 1980 2000 1975-2000
%
Austria 34.6 37.4 39.8 43.7 17
Belgium 34.5 40.1 42.4 45.6 14
Canada 30.8 31.9 30.7 35.8 12
Denmark 39.2 40 43.9 48.8 22
Finland 31.9 36.8 36.2 46.9 27
France 34.1 35.9 40.6 45.3 26
Germany 32.3 35.3 37.5 37.9 7
Ireland 28.8 29.1 31.4 31.1 7
Italy 26.1 26.1 30.4 42 61
Japan 20 21.2 25.1 27.1 28
Luxembourg 24.9 37.3 40.2 41.7 12
Netherlands 35.8 41.6 43.6 41.4 0
Norway 34.5 39.3 42.7 40.3 3
Portugal 19.4 20.8 24.1 34.5 66
Spain 16.3 18.8 23.1 35.2 87
Sweden 38.7 42.3 47.5 54.2 28
Switzerland 22.5 27.9 28.9 35.7 28
UK 37 35.3 35.2 37.4 6
USA 27.7 26.9 27 29.6 10
Average 29.95 32.84 35.28 39.69 21
Source: OECD (2002) Comparative Tables 1965-2000, Table 3 pp. 73-74.
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6. Transfers from federal to cantonal level:  another
element in achieving the balance
In 1959 Switzerland adopted a system of inter-cantonal tax redistribution
in order to promote national unity and to even out some of the differences
between the rich cantons and the poor ones.  13% of most federal tax is
redistributed from richer to poorer cantons every year, according to a complex
formula which takes into account per capita incomes, geography (mountainous
regions are intended to be subsidized) and “ﬁscal capacity”4.  On the other hand,
along with this federal grant comes control over how most of the money is to be
spent.  Thus only 30% of the 13% is “free” money to be spent as the recipient
canton wishes.
The idea is basically that « poor » (i.e. mountain) cantons might not be able
to raise enough revenue from their own tax base to provide public goods up to the
standard fixed by common agreement at the federal level (in areas such as
housing, the military, civil defence, education, environmental programmes, roads,
farming, water and avalanche management, etc.).  
Not only is it deemed that « poor » cantons’ capacity for raising their own
taxes is comparatively low, but it is also assumed that some of their costs of
providing public goods are greater than for richer and more urban cantons
(maintenance of public transport and roads in mountainous areas, coping with
land-slides and avalanches, for instance, costs more than in lowland urban
districts).   Furthermore, many town-dwellers spend their holidays or own holiday
homes in mountainous cantons and want a similar level of public services.
In the absence of such transfers, « poor » cantons might have to raise their
tax rates in order to raise revenues5, and in so doing might provoke an exodus of
the mobile tax base.  Or, inversely, poor cantons might lower their tax rates in
order to attract mobile tax payers.  In short, the transfer system aims to limit the
inter-cantonal movement of mobile tax resources and, incidentally, to limit the
need for harmonization of taxes.  It amounts, at a maximum, to 13% of 39% of
35.7% of Swiss GNP, namely 1.8% of GDP.
However, during the past 40 years, all kinds of differences between
cantons have grown rather than shrunk, and people commute over much longer
distances (over ever better roads and public transport facilities).  Inter-cantonal
ﬁscal competition is therefore lively, some rural cantons are accused of being free-
riders on neighbouring urban cantons’ public goods, and the Federal government
has become progressively more and more indebted.  A new system of
redistribution is therefore under discussion.  
In particular, it is suggested that more objective criteria for redistribution
should be adopted, that recipient cantons should enjoy more freedom to decide on
how the money should be spent (at present it is largely tied to federally
4 See Cornavin-Pfeiffer-1991, p. 242.
5 Cornavin-Pfeiffer-1991, pp .233-240.
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determined projects), and that inter-cantonal cooperation should be encouraged in
order to capture economies of scale in the provision of public goods.  If adopted,
this reform would actually redeﬁne Swiss federalism.  The idea of bolstering Swiss
national unity via inter-cantonal income redistribution under close federal
supervision would be replaced by the notion of greater decentralization in
deciding on how redistributed funds should be spent, along with a possible re-
drawing of cantonal frontiers on a functional basis.
As part of the collective cantonal effort to fight the centralizing trend
mentioned above, the cantons have kept the execution of many federal policies for
themselves, and indeed continue to participate financially in most federal
programmes (for roads, higher education, agriculture, civil defence, even the
military).  Furthermore, the cantons often act as agents for the Federal government
in the execution of its (federal) duties.  Thus it is very difficult indeed to
disentangle the lines of ﬁscal responsibility. Indeed, the citizen hardly ever comes
into direct contact with the federal government at all – subsidies, roads, agricultural
support, welfare payments etc. are all handled by the cantons or by semi-market
agencies.   This may account for a certain amount of “federal ﬁscal illusion”.  Thus
the Swiss may remain convinced that their cantons retain ﬁscal sovereignty, and
that there is no worrisome trend toward centralization, because they are rarely in
direct contact with the Federal level of government.  
7. Inter-cantonal tax and income dispersion
Table 5 shows both the extent of ﬁscal diversity in Switzerland and the fact
that there is no correlation at all between the level of taxation and per capita
incomes on a cantonal basis.  Average cantonal tax revenue as a share of GDP
ranges from a low of only 4.5% in Nidwalden, to a high of 18.8% in Geneva.  Per
capita incomes range from a low of 30,280 CHF in Obwalden, to 79,722 CHF in
Basel-City.  Indeed, Table 6 shows that all four extreme situations coexist.  High-
tax, high-income cantons (Basel City, Geneva) coexist with low-tax, low-income
cantons (central, mountainous regions).  More intriguingly, we ﬁnd a few low-tax,
high-income cantons (Zug, Zurich); and one high-tax, low-income canton (Ticino).
How can such diversity persist in such a small geographic area?  Does it
give rise to massive population movements?
In a small polity like Switzerland (the average size of cantons is only
270,000 inhabitants and the average size of communes is just 2,500 inhabitants)
one might indeed expect people and ﬁrms to be voting with their feet all the time6.
However, there is in fact very little evidence that this is so, despite the wide
dispersion of tax rates and incomes just described.  According to Kirchgässner and
Pommerehne7 this is because of the federally organized inter-cantonal tax
6 Tiebout-1956
7 Kirchgässner/Pommerehne-1996, p. 366.
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redistribution system.  This seems slightly implausible, given the small scale of
these transfers.   An alternative explanation might be that the referendum offers the
Swiss voter a good “voice” alternative to “exit”.
In addition, Swiss federalism having fostered and maintained local cultural
and linguistic speciﬁcities, people have a strong preference to stay put.  Tiebout’s
seminal paper referred to the United States, where people are far more foot-loose
and move easily at the margin, thus creating the homogenous local communities
he describes.  In Switzerland, one could argue that homogenous local communities
have existed for centuries and are so strongly based in tradition that they can afford
large fiscal disparities without provoking extensive inter-cantonal migration.  In
any event, each canton remains free to determine its own tax-and-spend mix and
seems to exercise this right without causing a disastrous “race to the bottom”.
TABLE 5
Cantonal tax revenues as % GDP and per capita cantonal GDP (1999, CH Fr)
Pc GDP
% CH Fr
Nidwalden 4.5 55,881
Obwalden 5.0 30,280
Schwyz 5.1 49,478
Zug 5.2 72,698
Appenzel Int 6.2 40,068
Schaffhausen 6.2 49,014
Uri 6.2 39768
Zurich 6.3 59,692
Aargau 6.6 44,332
Soleure 6.6 40,029
Thurgau 6.8 38,656
Appenzel Ext 6.9 39,418
Graubünden 7.1 41,476
Lucerne 7.3 37,956
Fribourg 7.8 36,410
Valais 7.8 33,514
Glarus 8.0 53551
St. Gallen 8.0 39,197
Bern 8.2 38,322
Jura 9.2 32,262
Vaud 9.2 46,046
Basel-Land 9.3 49,872
Neuchâtel 9.7 39,759
Ticino 11.5 38,526
Basel-Stadt 13.7 79,722
Genève 18.8 54,298
Switzerland 8.5 46,341
Source: Administration Fédérale des Finances,Finances publiques en Suisse 2000,
Tableau E4.3 and Département fédéral de l’économie, La Vie Economique (2003)
Tableau B17
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TABLE 6
Dispersion of tax rates and incomes across cantons
HIGH TAX LOW TAX
(12-19%) (5-7%)
HIGH INCOME BASEL CITY ZUG, ZURICH
(50-80,000 CHF) GENEVA NIDWALDEN,
SCHWYZ, 
SCHAFFHOUSEN
LOW INCOME TICINO AARGAU
(30-45,000 CHF) APPENZEL (INT 
& EXT)
GRAUBUNDEN
OBWALDEN
LUCERNE
SOLEURE, URI
Source : derived from Table 4
Feld and Kirchgässner8 try to discover whether cantons with low taxes
attract high income self-employed individuals and whether cantons with high
supplementary pensions attract low-income retirees.  The results are less than
startling and they ﬁnd some evidence for the former but not for the latter.  This
ﬁnding has implications for high tax cantons, like Geneva and Basle-City, which
are outliers in tax matters and regularly complain about competition from their
lower tax neighbours (respectively Vaud and Basel-Land), but anyone looking for
strong evidence either that low taxes are linked to high per capita incomes, or that
tax disparities result in harmful tax competition, will be disappointed.  There is no
correlation either way. 
This may be because two plausible effects cancel each other out.
According to H1 (the classical assumption), low taxes favour entrepreneurship and
economic growth in general, and should therefore be associated with wealth
creation.  However, according to what we call the public-choice assumption, (H3)
what politician in a rich and productive state can resist raising taxes from a wealthy
community?  Promising attractive public goods to be paid for out of economic
growth is something few politicians (and voters) can resist.  Thus one could argue
that an attractive location generating high incomes, strong agglomeration effects
and economic growth will tend to have correspondingly high taxes, reﬂecting the
higher ﬁscal potential of the location.  In the meantime, low taxes in some areas
may well fail to stimulate much economic activity, and may simply reflect the
economic reality of a poor location enjoying few agglomeration effects.  
8 Feld/Kirchgässner-2001
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The fact that, as Tables 5 and 6 show, no correlation exists either way,
suggests that both hypotheses may be at work simultaneously, along with others.
In short, Switzerland’s 26 cantons present many different tax and income proﬁles.
Only one pattern emerges:  lower-tax cantons tend to be grouped together in the
east of the country, while higher-tax cantons tend to be grouped together in the
west9.   This indeed suggests the existence of some inter-cantonal fiscal
competition, a theme to which we now turn.
8. Inter-cantonal ﬁscal competition
Inter-cantonal ﬁscal competition is a regular item of public debate.  The 1990
federal law on the harmonisation of tax bases referred to above was intended to
remove one major source of friction – the fact that some cantons regularly “negotiate”
special tax regimes on an ad hoc basis with wealthy foreigners, both firms and
individuals.  Many would claim that these practices are still current despite the federal
law. The so-called “forfait individuel” has not disappeared entirely, but has been
codiﬁed as a “special consumption tax” subject to (fairly) transparent rules. Rules for
offering foreign corporate entities special tax breaks have also been harmonised and
made more transparent.  But the fact that the press regularly reports on such special
deals suggests that they are far from having disappeared.
We therefore have a curious situation: while the Swiss themselves seldom
“vote with their feet”, and may pay fairly heavy taxes as a result, foreigners, almost
by deﬁnition, are not only foot-loose and respond to ﬁscal incentives, but inter-
cantonal competition in this regard can reach epic proportions.  
However, we would argue that this type of inter-cantonal competition is
mainly anecdotal, and is in fact regularly monitored by the Conférence des
Directeurs cantonaux des ﬁnances, a committee composed of all the cantonal tax
chiefs, who meet regularly to prevent too much blatant inter-cantonal poaching of
wealthy investors.  
More interesting is the contrast between east and west, mentioned earlier,
epitomized by the contrast between Geneva on the one hand (tax-to-GDP rate
18.8%) and Zurich on the other (tax-to-GDP rate 6.3%).  Both cantons have
comparable levels of per capita income (although Zurich is wealthier), but very
different tax rates.  Zurich conﬁrms H1, while Geneva seems to follow H3.
Zurich is surrounded by a “crown” of small, low-tax cantons
(Schaffhousen, Thurgau, St Gallen, Glarus, Zug, Schwyz, Nidwalden, Uri, Luzern,
Obwalden, Argau).  Although they are frequently criticized by Zurich for being free
riders on Zurich’s public facilities, it is conceivable that the reason why Zurich
corresponds more to the neo-classical hypothesis than to the public-choice
hypothesis, is precisely because of these numerous small competitors.  Geneva, on
the other hand, has only to cope with Vaud (middling tax ratios) – and France
9 Thierstein/al.-2003 p. 110, quoting a study by UBS Warburg.
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(much higher).  This gives Genevese voters and politicians the opportunity to
favour the public choice alternative.
However, the general picture which emerges from the data is one of
considerable inter-cantonal ﬁscal diversity over a tiny geographic area (43,000 km2),
with no evidence at all of a “race to the bottom”, the development of poor public
services or large migratory movements.  It cannot be argued that inter-cantonal
redistribution at a rate of 1.8% of GDP is enough to offset these disparities.
9. Conclusions
Despite a recent increase in the degree of centralization, Switzerland remains
decentralized compared to most other developed countries :  the central government
still only accounts for 39% of total public revenue/expenditure, which in turn accounts
for only 35.7% of GNP. Thus, central government accounts for no more than 14% of
GNP. 
This low level of central taxation combined with a low level of general
taxation, a  high absolute level of income and normal-to-better quality public goods,
provides at least one example of the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization and
competition is both feasible and efficient.  H1 is thus in conformity with the Swiss
experience.
To those who claim that this is only possible because Switzerland is a small
country, with no major defence or foreign policy responsibilities, one could answer
that Switzerland spends the same proportion of GNP on defence as France or the UK.
Nor is there evidence that there are major economies of scale in the provision of other
public goods.  Boring a tunnel under the Alps costs the same in Switzerland as in
France. 
Anyone looking for strong evidence of inter-cantonal fiscal competition
resulting in a race to the bottom will be disappointed.  Quite the contrary, there is
every sign that considerable cantonal disparities coexist without causing immense
migratory movements or other inefficiencies.  H2 is not born out by the Swiss
experience. 
Looking to the future, the pressure in favour of harmonization and/or
centralization is growing.  It comes from the tax authorities and the political parties,
but is usually resisted by the public.
The Socialist Party, for instance, has proposed that cantons should agree to
harmonization of taxes within a band of + or – 20% of the Swiss average tax rate, while
right-wing parties are pushing for an increase in VAT rates in the name of tax
efﬁciency, the idea being that cantons would then recover their “share” to spend as
they see fit.  This seemingly sensible measure would introduce a degree of fiscal
incoherence which could lead to higher over-all levels of taxation in the long run10.
There is therefore considerable political pressure building up in favour of
centralization and harmonization. 
10 See Curzon Price/Garello-2003.
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Whatever the outcome of these debates, the matter will have to pass the
public referendum test, and here the public is likely to vote in favour of local
autonomy and independence.  In fact, we would argue that while inter-cantonal
tax competition may have had some effect in keeping the over-all level of taxation
low in Switzerland (as suggested by the example of Zurich and its “crown” of small
competitors), we would also agree with REY11 that the main reason for the low
absolute level of Swiss taxation lies in the public referendum, operating at all three
levels of government.  
What do these ﬁndings imply for Europe as a whole ?  
If Switzerland can live with wide tax disparities within its borders, then
Europe as a whole, geographically 106 times larger than Switzerland, can
presumably live with even greater fiscal differences without “harmful” effects
appearing.  Rather, there would appear to be a very wide spectrum of feasible tax
rates depending on the specific political democratic choices of each country,
which are compatible with full economic and monetary union.  
The case of Switzerland shows that a relatively low rate of transfers
between richer and poorer nations/cantons is sufﬁcient to substitute politically for
tax harmonization.  The case of the enlarged EU involves much larger income
disparities, but also a much greater resistance to tax harmonization and, curiously
enough, a fairly wide tolerance for transfers between member states.  At this stage
no generalizations can be made.
However, as the “harmful tax competition” debate shows, the forces in
favour of tax harmonization and centralization are very strong, and will grow with
enlargement.  Some new members have adopted low, ﬂat levels of taxation as a
means of attracting investment and stimulating growth.  Older industrialized
western European countries, with high and progressive tax systems will suffer an
exodus of mobile resources unless they either adopt more competitive tax proﬁles,
or persuade their new partners to abandon theirs.  
The main pressure in favour of tax harmonization comes from the tax
authorities themselves, followed at some distance by most political parties anxious
not to see their tax base competed away, however unfounded this fear may be.
The pressure on the part of tax authorities in the EU to coordinate taxes, possibly
just tax structures as in Switzerland, will be intense and will grow with time.  This
would make inter-country tax comparisons more transparent, and might be a ﬁrst
step in a more formal harmonization process.
However, it is not necessarily in the interest of governments as a whole to
accede to these pressures on the part of their tax authorities.  To the extent that tax
differences represent deliberate choices on the part of the governments concerned,
are part of the political balance of power, or are consciously designed to promote
economic growth, these governments should be as keen as the Swiss cantons to
preserve their sovereignty in tax matters.
The public in EU countries could do worse than to put pressure on their
own political parties to grant them referendum rights in setting taxes.
11 Rey-1990, p. 41.
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